Abstract. We analyse the effects of government-sponsored training for the unemployed conducted during East German transition. For the microeconometric analysis, we use a new, large and informative administrative database that allows us to use matching methods to address potential selection bias, to study different types of programmes and to observe labour market outcomes over eight years. We find strong evidence that, on average, the training programmes under investigation increase long-term employment prospects and earnings. However, as an important exception, the longer training programmes are not helpful for their male participants. At least part of the explanation for this negative result is that caseworkers severely misjudged the structure of the future demand for skills.
INTRODUCTION
During the course of the monetary, economic and social union in July 1990, East Germany adopted most of the regulations that govern economic life from West Germany (currency, legal order, wage structure, social system, etc.). Transitional arrangements were rare. For example, a low-wage policy by devaluating the currency, as used by other transition countries, was not possible. As a result, the formerly centrally planned East German economyThe first author is also affiliated with CEPR, London, ZEW, Mannheim, IZA, Bonn, and PSI, London.
O' Leary et al., 1998; Puhani, 1999) , 1 the Slovak Republic (Lubyova and Van Ours, 1999) and Hungary (O'Leary, 1998a; O'Leary et al., 1998) suggests that training programmes succeeded in raising the individual employment probabilities of participants, the evidence for East Germany is mixed, so far. The earlier studies for East Germany use survey data that are rather limited with respect to the length of the observation period, sample size and the availability of sufficiently detailed information to account for selectivity and programme heterogeneity.
2 Most of these studies use parametric models 3 and find negative or insignificant short-to medium-term employment effects (e.g. Hübler, 1998; Hujer and Wellner, 2000; Pannenberg, 1995) , but there are also studies that obtain positive effects (e.g. Pannenberg and Helberger, 1997; Prey, 1999) . The lack of robustness is due to the sensitivity of the results to different parametric assumptions, small sample sizes and the inability to measure long-run effects. Recent evidence based on new administrative data shows that negative lockin effects during and shortly after programme participation are important in East Germany. Hujer et al. (2004) estimate a multivariate mixed proportional hazard rate model to analyse the effects of government-sponsored training conducted in the period 2000-02 on the transition rate into regular employment. Because of the short time horizon available to observe outcomes, the negative lock-in effects drive their results. Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) and Speckesser (2004) draw their sample from the same administrative records, as we do. However, they restrict their analysis to one special type of government-sponsored training and observe outcomes for 36 months after the beginning of the programme only, compared with 96 months in this study. Based on propensity score matching, they find negative lock-in effects up to 12-18 months after programme start. Speckesser (2004) , who focuses on training conducted in the period 1993-94, finds no significant effects thereafter, mainly because of rapidly decreasing sample size towards the end of his observation period. Fitzenberger and Speckesser (2005) , who cover a longer period of programme participation , obtain positive employment effects of about 5-10% points about 20 months after the programme start.
Altogether, we extend the literature in several dimensions. First, using a newly available administrative database allows us to measure the effects of different training programmes over eight years, thereby uncovering the potentially important long-run effects of substantial government-sponsored training programmes and distinguishing these effects from the lock-in effects that occur in the short run. Second, we check the heterogeneity across programmes and groups of participants, which enables us to add to the discussion of correct targeting of ALMP measures. Third, the database is particularly rich with respect to information concerning the selection process, and so we can address selection issues in a reasonable way. Finally, the sample used is large enough to allow non-or at least semi-parametric estimation of the effects using matching methods.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: in the next section, we outline those parts of the ALMP in East Germany that are important for our paper. Section 3 describes our data. Section 4 outlines our econometric strategy. Section 5 presents the main results as well as a summary of an extensive sensitivity analysis. Section 6 concludes. Two appendices provide additional information on the data and the estimation procedure.
LABOUR MARKET POLICIES IN EAST GERMANY

Use of ALMP during East German transition
The rapid contraction of the East German economy after unification led to sharp reductions in labour demand. To cope with the immediate strongly adverse effects of this, different instruments of ALMP were used. Immediately after unification, short-time work (a reduction in work hours, combined with a subsidy from the unemployment insurance system to compensate the earnings loss) and early retirement schemes played a major role. In East Germany, especially in 1991, the main objective of short-time work was to delay the transition into unemployment to prevent the official unemployment rate from skyrocketing. In that year, more than 1.6 million people were directly absorbed into short-time work (see Table 1 ).
Because the skills of the labour force did not meet the requirements of a modern market economy, different kinds of training programmes were introduced on a large scale to lessen these skill deficits. In 1991, 800,000 individuals participated in some form of labour market training. Since then, the number of participants has declined, but with 468,000 participants in 2003, training is still the most important ALMP programme in East Germany.
A third type of ALMP was subsidised employment, which comprised temporary wage subsidies to compensate for reduced productivity during the phase of initial skill adaptation in a new job, and so-called employment programmes that provided subsidised jobs outside the regular labour market. In times of high and persistent unemployment, employment programmes are supposed to be an important measure to maintain the employability of unemployed and especially long-term unemployed persons, as well as to preserve social stability in regions with particularly high rates of unemployment. 
Training the Unemployed in a Changing Economy
Training as a part of German ALMP
In Germany, labour market training consists of very heterogeneous instruments that differ largely in the form and intensity of the human capital investment as well as in their respective duration. Traditionally, German training courses have the aim of assessing, maintaining or improving the occupational knowledge and skills of the participant, of adjusting skills to technological changes, of facilitating a career improvement or of awarding a first vocational degree. In the East German transition process, however, the use of the two latter categories was negligible because the main objective of training programmes was to adjust the skills of the East German labour force to the requirements of a modern market economy. Usually, participants in such training programmes receive a transfer payment that is of the same amount as unemployment benefits (UB). 4 Moreover, the public employment service ( PES) bears the direct cost of the programme, and it may cover parts of additional expenses for childcare, transportation and accommodation.
For our analysis, we aggregate the different programmes into groups according to their homogeneity with respect to selection of participants, educational contents and organisation, as well as sample size and information available to distinguish different types of programmes. Table 2 shows the resulting groups of training programmes plus a residual category. Ignoring the programme types for which the number of observations is too small, we restrict our analysis to general further vocational training and retraining programmes.
Further training comprises courses that provide a general adjustment of working skills or an additional qualification in the profession currently held, as well as courses that award a first vocational degree. Planned durations range from one month to two years (cf. Figure 1) . Because further training is a fairly large and heterogeneous group, we split it into two subgroups based on the planned duration of an individual course. As a characterisation of the programme and not its participants, planned instead of actual duration has the advantage that the behaviour of the individual during participation does not influence it (e.g. a short actual duration could be associated with a short course or a long course that a participant left early). Retraining enables working in a profession different from the one currently held by awarding a new vocational degree. Planned durations are long (up to three years, 21 months on average). The acquired skills are equivalent to an apprenticeship in the German apprenticeship system. Thus, the human capital investment is quite substantial. Note that, generally, the German programmes are long on average compared with other OECD and transition countries (e.g. OECD, 1996a OECD, , 1996b . Moreover, most training courses are full-time courses, and in addition to classroom training, a course may include on-the-job training, which is frequently the case in courses that award a vocational degree.
DATA AND DEFINITION OF THE EVALUATION SAMPLE
The data
We use the same administrative database as in Lechner et al. (2004) and refer the reader to that paper for more details. It combines three different sources: the IAB Employment Subsample, the benefit payment register and the training participants data.
5 For East Germany, it covers the period 1990-2002. With this Note: Owing to insufficient sample size, the category other programmes is not evaluated in this study.
5. The common German abbreviations for these data sources are IABS, LED and FuU, respectively. A detailed description of the IABS and the LED is provided by Bender et al. (1996 Bender et al. ( , 2000 . For the FuU, see Miquel et al. (2002) . See also Bender et al. (2005) for how the data have been prepared for evaluation purposes.
database, we are able to reconstruct up to 12 years of individual postunification employment histories. It contains detailed personal, regional, employer and earnings information (see Appendix A for a complete list of variables). Thus, it allows controlling for many if not most of the factors that determine selection into programmes (see the detailed discussion in Section 4.2) as well as a precise measurement of interesting outcome variables (e.g. employment status, earnings). Moreover, we are able to distinguish different programme types and it has a sufficient number of observations for the major programme groups to account for programme heterogeneity. Of course, there are several drawbacks as well. First, the data do not cover non-working recipients of social assistance because they do not receive benefits from the PES but from the local authorities. Second, employment that is not subject to social security contributions is unobserved. On the one hand, this includes self-employment and working as a civil servant ('Beamter'). On the other hand, this regards minor employment below the relevant earnings threshold. Third, it is possible to distinguish between subsidised and regular employment only from the year 2000 onwards. This problem is particularly severe for East Germany, because a substantial part of the labour force were in subsidised employment during the 1990s (see Table 1 ). Fourth, the training information for East Germany before 1993 is incomplete and not correctly coded. Fifth, the unification process had a direct impact on the data-gathering process. Data collection, which depends to a considerable part on reports from employers, was phased in after unification. Some employers provided information as early as 1991, whereas in most cases it took until 1992 until all employers were registered with the authorities. Therefore, our sample is selected on either having an initial employment or unemployment spell in the data. Thus, later on, we condition on having observed an employment spell before the unemployment spell leading to participation. The sixth drawback is that information about long-term employment histories is absent. However, because in the German Democratic Republic unemployment was (officially) absent and labour force participation was very high, the resulting additional unobserved heterogeneity should be very small, in particular because unification per se certainly discounted the value of human capital and experience obtained under the old centrally planned economic system. Despite these drawbacks, compared with what was used in the literature so far, this database is a substantial improvement in several dimensions, like sample size, selection and outcome information, as well as observable programme heterogeneity.
Definition of programme participation
In this section, we define 'participation in a programme' and our population of interest. First, because the programme participation data are of good quality only after 1992, we consider programme participation between 1993 and 1994. By choosing this period, we are able to focus on the most recent programmes that still allow for a long enough observation period for detecting long-run effects. 6 Second, a person is included in our population of interest if he starts an unemployment spell between 1993 and 1994. The group of participants in training consists of all persons entering a programme between the beginning of the first unemployment spell after 1992 and the end of 1994. If there are multiple participations in this period, then only the first one is included in the analysis.
The left panel of Figure 2 shows the distribution of starting months in the two-year window we consider. Partly due to the construction of our sample, the probability of treatment increases over time. The right panel of Figure 2 shows the number of months it takes until participation after the beginning of the 'defining' unemployment spell (the first UE spell between 1993 and 1994). From the latter graph, it seems that a considerable group of trainees enter training fairly (surprisingly) early in the spell, particularly for retraining.
Given our definition of a small treatment window (although often much smaller windows are used in the literature, e.g. Dorsett, 2006) , and taking up the arguments in Johansson (2003, 2004) it is particularly important for the interpretation of our results what share of the control groups receives treatment as well (similar to the problem of substitution bias in an experiment). The fact that we condition non-participation on ending unemployment without entering a programme (or not ending unemployment at all) before 1995 might lead to some bias in our results in favour of the so-defined non-participation status. This bias should be severe if nearly every unemployed has to participate. However, Table 3 shows that only about 17% of those classified as non-participants receive some training between 1995 and 1997 (the participation information in that database ends in 1997).
7
From Table 3 , we can also see that second or further participations ('programme careers') appear not to be a major problem for the interpretation of our results. Less than 20% of the trainees participate a second time, often in the same programme type as they already participated in. 8 The conceptual problem with analysing the effect of e.g. the second participation is that the second participation may be influenced by the success of the first programme. Thus, such an analysis of the effects of sequences of programmes requires a dynamic evaluation approach as suggested by Lechner (2004) and Lechner and Miquel (2005) , which is not feasible with our data without further aggregation of programme types, which, in turn, is undesirable for obvious reasons.
6. Furthermore, because we observe only training spells after the participant left training, and some courses have a duration of more than two years, and there is no training information after 1997, concentrating on the years 1993 and 1994 does not lead to a selective underrepresentation of long training spells. 7. Also note that the approach suggested by Johansson (2003, 2004) , as applied e.g. by Sianesi (2004) or Steiger (2004) , estimates a different causal effect that is not of particular interest in our study. 8. Overall, about 20% of the registered unemployed enter government-sponsored training per year (BA, 1992 (BA, -2004 .
M. Lechner et al. 
Selection of population and sample
When choosing the appropriate subpopulation from our inflow sample into unemployment, we aim at having a homogeneous group of people that covers the prime age part of the East German population who is eligible for participation in training. Therefore, we require that all individuals were employed 9 at least once before programme participation and that they received UB or unemployment assistance (UA) in the month before programme start (as well as in the month of programme start for non-participants).
10 This, however, requires the use of variables measured relative to the start date of the programme.
11 In this paper, we follow one of the approaches suggested by Lechner (1999) . We simulate start dates for non-participants by drawing start dates from the empirical distribution for participants and then ensuring that this 9. 'Employed' means that we observe the person at least once in insured employment in the IABS (for the majority of our individuals, the first observation in the data is an employment spell). 10. In fact, receipt of UB or UA directly before entering a programme is not entirely sufficient to ensure eligibility. Individuals must also have a formal professional degree plus three years of work experience (since 1994, zero years), or alternatively at least six years (since 1994, three years) of work experience. Thus, by also requiring individuals to be employed at least once before the programme, the remaining group of participants and non-participants is most likely to be eligible. 11. Moreover, all variables potentially influencing both selection into programmes and outcomes are measured relative to the start of the programme.
date does not lie before the beginning of the 'defining' UE spell, or after 1994 or of the person's last spell that is observed in the data if it ended before 1995.
12
To avoid most influences arising from retirement, early retirement and primary education, we also impose an age restriction (20-53 years) in the year of the (hypothetical) programme start. Concentrating on the main body of the active labour force, we exclude unemployed who were trainees, home workers, apprentices or without previous employment or whose last employment before the 'defining' UE spell was less intensive than half of the usual full-time work hours. Furthermore, because the group of foreigners is extremely heterogeneous in East Germany (there is no 'stable' and at least partly assimilated guest worker population, as in West Germany), we drop them as well. Table 4 shows how the sample shrinks when imposing these criteria. The largest drop in the number of observations occurs for non-participants to make them a priori comparable to the treated using the criteria above, which they have to fulfil at the simulated start date. However, because we still keep almost 5,000 unemployed non-participants, the large reduction is of no serious concern. The reduction for participants is small (about 20% on average). Note: All variables are measured before or in the year of the start of the programme.
12. Non-participants who do not satisfy this criterion are excluded. We tested an alternative procedure for assigning hypothetical start dates to non-participants. We randomly draw from the empirical distribution of elapsed unemployment durations before programme start of participants and check whether the respective non-participant has at least the same unemployment duration. If so, we assign as the hypothetical starting date the month after the drawn unemployment duration. Our results remain almost unchanged (see Section 5.4).
Training the Unemployed in a Changing Economy 3.4. Descriptive statistics Table 5 shows descriptive statistics for selected socioeconomic variables for the different subsamples that are defined by treatment status. The results can be summarised as follows: (i) participants in retraining are on average 32 years old and thus on average about five years younger than other unemployed. This is in line with the idea that substantive human capital investments are more beneficial the longer the productive period of the new human capital is. (ii) Participants in retraining are less educated and skilled than the rest. (iii) Participants in short and particularly participants in long training are better educated and were in higher job positions in their previous job than the rest. (iv) Remaining UB claims before participation do not show much variation. (v) The share of women among the unemployed is much higher in East Germany than e.g. in West Germany, which is reflected in their high share among non-participants and participants in long and short training, but not in their share observed in retraining, which shows a 'male' bias. (vi) There are some regional differences, however, that do not appear to be related to the local unemployment rate (see Appendix A for a list of more disaggregated regional). (vii) Finally, in 2002, subsidised employment is still a considerable part of employment (about 15% of all employment is subsidised; this information is unavailable before 2000 and incomplete for 2000-01). Furthermore, Table A .1 shows that only very few people in our evaluation sample participated in a programme before the programme participation we are evaluating. Figure 3 displays the time path of (subsidised and unsubsidised) employment and unemployment rates for the different groups of participants and non-participants relative to the actual or simulated beginning of the training. By construction of the sample, all members of these groups must be unemployed in the month before participation. Thus, the unemployment and employment rates show the usual increase/dip before participation (cf. Ashenfelter, 1978) . Furthermore, note that all individuals must be employed at some point in time before the unemployment spell in which participation occurs. Thus, there is a sharp increase in unemployment rates starting about one year before participation and a corresponding decline in employment rates.
After the programme, all employment measures show some recovery. The immediate speed of the recovery is negatively related to programme duration, pointing to a lock-in effect of participation (cf. Van Ours, 2004) . None of the groups reaches its previous level, but the rate of recovery for non-participants is particularly low, already foreshadowing the results of the econometric part below. Note the interesting difference that appears between unemployment and employment. Both measures of labour market attachment show the same shape over time. However, for registered unemployed (defined as receipt of some form of benefits or participation in training), there does not appear to be any difference between the different M. Lechner et al. Training the Unemployed in a Changing Economy The employment and unemployment information is given only up to 36 months before training. Owing to the process of gathering administrative data after unification, many unemployed may be observed for shorter periods.
M. Lechner et al. Rubin, 1974) , to define our parameters of interest -the average treatment effects on the treated (ATETs) for pair-wise comparisons of the effects of different states (Lechner, 2001 (Lechner, , 2002a (Lechner, , 2002b :
The ATET ðy m;l 0 Þ is the expected effect for an individual who is drawn randomly from the population of participants in treatment m only. Without further assumptions, ATETs are not identified from the data. But if we can observe all factors that jointly influence outcomes and the participation decision, then -conditional on these factors (call them X) -the participation decision and the outcomes are independent. This property is exploited by the conditional independence assumption (CIA).
Is the CIA plausible with our data?
Plausibility of the CIA requires that all major factors that jointly determine participation and outcomes are observed in the data. Thus, we should identify these variables and show that they are available in our data. This requires an understanding of the underlying participation decisions. Selection into programmes is determined by three main factors that are discussed in turn: eligibility, selection by caseworkers and self-selection by potential participants.
In Germany, eligibility requires that the potential participant qualifies for or receives unemployment insurance payments. Moreover, he must have a vocational degree from the German apprenticeship or higher education system, or a minimum amount of work experience in one field of profession. We control for these factors using the education variables, the individual employment records and the entries from the benefit payment register.
Usually, it is the caseworker but it may also be the unemployed himself who proposes participation in training to improve employment prospects. In any case, the unemployed must apply before the beginning of the programme. The caseworker decides whether he will be admitted or not. There is no legal entitlement to participation, and caseworkers have a considerable amount of discretion. Usually, the caseworker decides in consultation with the potential participant whether or not and if so, what kind of training programme would be appropriate based on an assessment of the employment prospects and the specific qualification needs of the unemployed. According to German legislation, caseworkers have to take into account the chances of the unemployed for completing a specific programme successfully, and the situation in the local labour market. Variables capturing information about employment prospects and chances for successful completion of a programme include age, educational attainment, family status and past employment histories including information about past employers, earnings, position in job, specific occupation and industry. Moreover, our data contain detailed regional information that allow us to control for local labour market conditions, like the industrial, employment, population and wealth composition of the region as well as migration streams, tax revenues and local unemployment rates. In addition, because unemployment was rapidly rising during 1993 and 1994 and participation showed a varying pattern, we condition on the month of the start of the programmes, thus netting out seasonal and timing effects.
From the point of view of the unemployed, his decision whether or not to participate in a programme is guided by considerations very similar to those of the caseworker. There are, however, additional reasons for joining or not joining a programme. If, e.g., the unemployed sees no chance to find a job anyway, with or without a programme, he may prefer not to join a programme that reduces his leisure time (an important issue in the rapidly contracting East German economy). This again requires controlling for all factors that determine individual employment prospects and labour market conditions. Moreover, legislation provides rather strong incentives to participate in government-supported training. On the one hand, unemployed who refuse to participate in a training course risk suspension of their UBs. On the other hand, periods during which unemployed receive transfer payments while participating in a training programme count towards acquisition of UB claims. Therefore, we constructed variables from the (un)employment histories that indicate the UB claim at the beginning and at the end of a spell.
Although this is much more information than usually available in studies that rely on the CIA (e.g. Brodaty et al., 2001; Dorsett, 2006; Larsson, 2003) , there are some potentially important factors missing. In contrast to Gerfin and Lechner (2002) or Sianesi (2004) , there is no information about the caseworker's direct assessment of the characteristics and prospects of the unemployed, e.g. with respect to motivation and ability. Moreover, we do not observe things like jail and health histories. For these variables, we have to rely on their indirect effects, i.e. on their effects on the employment and earnings history that materialised in the past. The fact that we do not observe pre-unification employment histories should not lead to additional unobserved heterogeneity because in the German Democratic Republic, unemployment was (officially) absent and labour force participation was very high. In addition, unification per se certainly discounted the value of human capital and experience obtained under the old centrally planned economic system. Thus, what is important is what happened during the rapid transition period directly after unification. Although we do not fully observe this period due to the phasing-in of the data, we capture the most important parts of it by the choice of our evaluation sample and period.
A note on estimation
Having established identification of the effects, i.e. the general feasibility of consistent estimation of the effects, the question of the appropriate estimator arises. All possible parametric, semi-and non-parametric estimators are implicitly or explicitly built on the principle that for every comparison of two programmes, for every participant of one of those programmes, we need a comparison observation from the other programme with the same characteristics regarding all factors that jointly influence selection and outcomes (see Section 4.2 for these variables). Here, we use propensity score matching estimators for multiple treatments as our baseline estimator to produce such comparisons. A clear advantage of these estimators is that they are essentially non-parametric and that they allow arbitrary individual effect heterogeneity (see , for matching with a binary treatment, and Imbens, 2000, and Lechner, 2001 , for multiple treatments; Imbens, 2004 , provides an excellent survey of the recent advances in this field). Gerfin and Lechner (2002) and Larsson (2003) used this estimator, among many others.
Appendix IC contains the detailed results of a multivariate analysis that models selection into the different groups based on a multinomial probit model that is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. Beyond providing useful descriptive statistics, the output from this selection model plays a key role in our selection correction mechanism because we use the estimated conditional on X choice probabilities (the so-called propensity scores) to form our comparison groups. The analysis revealed that gender, age, education and last occupation are important individual characteristics that determine participation. Furthermore, although observed employment and unemployment histories are short, they are significantly correlated with participation choice. Regional information, such as the industrial, employment, population and wealth composition of the region as well as migration streams and tax revenues, which entered the probit in a highly disaggregated way to capture the specifics of supply and demand in the local labour market, play important roles in the selection process.
In addition to the propensity scores, we include as matching variables gender and the date of the beginning of the programme as well as three dummies that indicate whether the participant is observed employed 12, 24 and 36 months before the programme to make sure that we match correctly on these important variables. However, excluding all additional matching variables except gender, or adding elapsed unemployment duration before the programme does not change the qualitative results that we obtain for the effects of training (see Section 5.4 and the internet appendix for details).
We improve the standard matching estimator for multiple treatments in two dimensions: to allow for a higher precision when many 'good' comparison observations are available, we incorporate the idea of calliper or radius matching (e.g. Dehejia and Wahba, 2002) into the standard algorithm. Furthermore, we increase the matching quality by exploiting the fact that appropriate weighted regressions that use the sampling weights from matching have the so-called double robustness property. This property implies that the estimator remains consistent if either the matching step is based on a correctly specified selection model or if the regression model is correctly specified (e.g. Joffe et al., 2004; Rubin, 1979) . Moreover, this procedure should reduce small sample as well as asymptotic bias of matching estimators (see Abadie and Imbens, 2006) and thus increase the robustness of the estimator.
The actual matching protocol is presented in detail in Appendix B. All issues concerning the estimation and tests of its operational characteristics are contained in the internet appendix (see in particular Appendix IB for the implications of imposing common support, and match quality). Lechner et al. (2004) contains more technical information about the estimators that are omitted here for the sake of brevity. The most important sensitivity checks are also discussed in Section 5.4. In summary, our estimation results are not sensitive to issues concerning the implementation of the estimator.
EFFECTS OF TRAINING
Measurement of the labour market outcomes
According to German legislation, the most important objectives of ALMP are to increase re-employment chances and to reduce the probability of remaining unemployed. Therefore, our outcome variables relate to the employment status, like registered unemployment and different types of employment (e.g. requiring a certain quality of the job, approximated by the job's duration or by the earnings compared with the previous job). Registered unemployment is defined as receipt of some form of benefits from the PES or participation in a training programme. We also consider gross earnings, which is a crude measure for individual productivity. Below, we only present the results for those outcome variables that are most interesting. For all the others, the reader may consult the internet appendix, which contains all background material.
Effects are measured monthly based on process time: Month 1 in process time is the month after the programme started (with simulated start dates for non-participants). Focusing on the beginning instead of the end rules out that programmes appear to be successful just because they keep their participants busy by making them stay in the programme. We consider a M. Lechner et al. As noted earlier, our employment-related outcome variables have the problem that we cannot distinguish subsidised and unsubsidised employment before the year 2000. Beginning in 2000, this becomes possible, although for 2000 and 2001 there is some underreporting. Because in East Germany subsidised jobs were used on a large scale in the early and mid1990s; all results presented below that relate to this period have to be interpreted with that caveat in mind. Nevertheless, we do have a clean measure of the long-run effects in Tables 6-8. Table 6 shows the mean outcomes (ATETs) for all comparisons. We concentrate on the effects eight years after participation started and the three outcome variables unsubsidised employment, unemployment and earnings. Compared with non-participation and using unsubsidised employment as an outcome variable, we find that short training and retraining have substantial positive effects on average: around a magnitude of a 10% point gain in employment. The effects of long training are not significantly different from zero, though. The estimators of the pair-wise comparisons are subject to more sampling error due to the much smaller comparison samples, thus requiring a larger magnitude of the effect to become significant. Therefore, it is not surprising that -with few exceptions like the dominance of retraining compared with long training for participants in long training -the effects are hardly significant.
Mean effects of the programmes for their participants
The following figures show how the effects evolve over time. Figure 4 displays the estimates of the employment and unemployment effects of the different programmes (compared with all other states) for participants in the respective programmes (ATETs). A line above zero indicates that the programme has a positive effect relative to the one (or non-participation) associated with that particular line. In other words, a line above zero is good news for the programme appearing in the header of the respective graph and bad news for the one associated with a particular line. Only effects significant at the 5% level are displayed. To use a consistent definition of employment over time, in these figures employment comprises both subsidised and unsubsidised employment. The difference between these two types is very small for about the last 20 months, but could be important for the short-and medium-run results, given the number of employees in subsidised employment (see Section 2.1).
The results for long training and retraining show negative short-run effects that are larger the longer the programme. However, because we are not able to distinguish subsidised and unsubsidised employment in the short run, the lock-in effects that are present in all figures may be just because nonparticipants and participants in short training move to employment Notes: Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics at the 10% level and * at the 1% level. Cells shaded in grey indicate that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. a For the comparison short trainingÀretraining, only the pair-wise differences unskilledÀskilled and skilledÀsalaried are significant. b Includes master craftsman. MNP estimates from the joint model, but the remaining steps of the estimation are performed in the subsamples. The number of observations does not add up to the one in the full sample because the common support criterion must delete more observations if used in subsamples (see the internet appendix).
Notes:
Bold numbers indicate significance at the 5% level, numbers in italics relate to the 10% level and * to the 1% level. Cells shaded in grey indicate that the difference of the two estimated effects is significant at the 5% level. M, Men; W, Women. Results are based on estimates in the different subsamples (including the MNP estimation) for men and women. Because the effects for men and women based on the common estimation of the MNP model show considerable effect heterogeneity, it appears to be possible that more flexibility is required when estimating the decision to participate in a programme. Therefore, we estimate MNPs for men and women separately, but we do not find significant differences in the effects compared with the case with a common MNP model. programmes afterwards. 13 In the longer run and with respect to employment, Figure 4 confirms the results of Table 6 in that retraining and short training dominate non-participation on average. Long training seems to have positive effects as well, although they are not significant at the end of the observation window. Yet, participants in long training would have benefited more had they participated in retraining instead. The effects with respect to unemployment are all zero in the long run (as suggested by Figure 3 ). This is probably related to the fact that training increases the period of receipt of UB and/or that after remaining unemployed for such a long time, discouraged nonparticipants leave the labour force.
Training the Unemployed in a Changing
The results in Figure 5 suggest that training consistently increases monthly earnings by about 100-200 EUR in the longer run for all training programmes (see also Table 6 ), although the results are not always significant for retrainees.
To check whether jobs are (somewhat) stable, we use an outcome variable that requires at least seven months of continuous employment (six months is the usual probation period in Germany, within which termination of a job is very easy for both sides). We obtain comparable results. The results are also confirmed when we use employment that pays at least 90% of the job held before training (the results are available in the internet appendix).
Heterogeneity by types of unemployed
So far, we have considered the average effects for the participants in the different programmes. Because the participants are heterogeneous, there may be differences in how the programmes affect different types of individuals. Therefore, we stratify the sample along the dimensions unemployment duration, type of region, type of occupation and gender and match within the strata. Note that the scope of this exercise is limited by the size of the subsamples. We find significant differences of the effects for the regional unemployment rate, the type of occupation before training and gender (see Tables 7 and 8 ). The overall positive effect of short training is driven by its high effectiveness in regions with a comparatively low unemployment rate, whereas in the other regions it seems to be ineffective. Furthermore, the subsample results for different types of occupations suggest that short training may be the most effective programme for skilled workers. However, the samples underlying these estimates may be too small to draw robust inferences.
Clearly, the most substantial differences occur with respect to gender and the two longer training programmes (see Table 8 ). Compared with non-participation, retraining increases the employment rate of participating 13. Because of this ambiguity, we do not present cumulated effects as we did for West Germany in Lechner et al. (2004) .
M. Lechner et al. women by about 25% points. It decreases unemployment by about 8% points and increases monthly earnings by about 400 EUR. Retraining is, however, completely ineffective for participating men. The effects of long training exhibit gender differences, too. The negative effects for month 96 indicate that participating in long training really hurts men by reducing their employment probabilities and increasing their unemployment probabilities. But this month is really an exception. For almost all other months, a zero effect for long training compared with non-participation cannot be rejected by the data and the male-female difference is smaller than for retraining. Short training courses appear to be effective for both men and women. The reason for these stark gender differences appears to be different types of training obtained by women and men. Table 9 shows the shares in the original professions (before training) and the profession a course is planned to qualify for (target profession) in our sample of training participants, for men (upper panel) and women (lower panel) and the different types of training. The last two columns state the profession-specific unemployment rates in 1994 and 2002. In general, we see that men in the metal production/processing and mechanics sector are much more likely to receive either short training or retraining, whereas long training is somewhat concentrated among technical professions. For women, long and short training is concentrated in officerelated occupations. Female retrainees are more evenly spread across occupations. Comparing original and target professions for short training, not many differences appear, which is in line with the aims of these programmes. For men in long training, some professions decline (agriculture, mining, forestry; metalrelated occupations; technical professions; health and social services; education-related professions), but construction as well as office-related professions increase. For women in long training, we see a considerable increase in officerelated occupations, and a decrease everywhere else.
The most interesting case is clearly retraining. For about 71% of the unemployed male, the target profession of retraining was construction related (in particular, craft-related professions), whereas this share was only 5% for women. The male share of this type of occupation among original professions was only 11%.
14 About one-third of the women had some officerelated target profession, about another 20% were directed towards health-, social-and education-related professions. These choices of target professions by the caseworkers and the unemployed may have been rational in the years 1993 and 1994 when the major destinations for male and female unemployed showed average or below-average unemployment rates. This is confirmed in Table 9 by the correlations between the difference in the shares in target and original profession and the unemployment rates, which are negative for all types of training and both men and women in 1994. However, as indicated by 14. The inflow into construction comes from all occupations, with the exception of the group health/social services, education (see Table A .1 in the internet appendix).
M. Lechner et al. a positive correlation in 2002, the long-run prediction for men turned out to be very bad, because of the bust in the construction sector in the second half of the 1990s -just at the time most of the retrainees completed their programme. In 2002, the unemployment rates in the construction-related professions were around 30% compared with an already high East German average of about 22%. In contrast, women were luckier. The unemployment rates in their main target professions were still below average in 2002, and the respective correlation is negative. Significant gender differences in programme effects have been found in several other evaluation studies that analyse ALMPs; see e.g. Kluve et al. (1999 Kluve et al. ( , 2004 and Puhani (1999) for Poland as well as the surveys by Friedlander et al. (1997) and for Western market economies. Rather than indicating that a programme has different effects for men and women, our findings suggest that these differences may occur because women in fact attend different programmes than men.
Sensitivity analysis
We performed several sensitivity tests to check the robustness of our results to implementation issues. We only present a summary of the results and refer the interested reader to the internet appendix for any details.
We checked whether our sample selection and matching algorithm succeeds in balancing participants' and non-participants' elapsed unemployment duration before the actual or simulated programme start. On the one hand, we used a different procedure for simulating programme start dates for nonparticipants. We randomly draw from the empirical distribution of elapsed unemployment durations before programme start of participants and check whether the respective non-participant has at least the same unemployment duration. If so, we assign as a hypothetical starting date the month after the drawn unemployment duration. 15 Our results are almost unchanged by this new procedure. On the other hand, we include the elapsed UE duration before programme start as an additional matching variable to make sure that we match correctly on that variable. Again, our results remain largely unaffected.
In addition, the common support criterion is tightened by defining the upper and lower bounds as the tenth largest and smallest observation instead of the minimum or maximum. This leads to a better match in the tails of the propensity score distribution. Although a considerable number of observations are dropped, the effects hardly change in magnitude, although there is some change in significance levels. Nevertheless, the overall conclusions do not change.
Moreover, the additional matching variables other than gender that are included in the definition of the distance metric in the matching algorithm are not used. The results are qualitatively identical, but in particular for retraining, the effects are somewhat smaller and fewer of them are significant.
The fourth test concerned smoothing the estimated effects by computing three-month moving averages of the respective outcome variables, thus increasing precision. The efficiency gains are very small.
Finally, the region Berlin could be a special case because it combines East Berlin (former capital of the GDR) with West Berlin, which experienced the West German economic system even before unification. Therefore, we rerun all estimations excluding all inhabitants of Berlin (the distinction between East and West Berlin before unification is not possible with our data). Again, the results are qualitatively identical.
CONCLUSION
We analyse the effects of government-sponsored training for the unemployed in the beginning of the transition process in East Germany. Our analysis is based on new, large and very informative administrative data that allow us to control for potential selection bias, to use robust non-parametric matching estimators in a multiple treatment framework, to account for treatment effect heterogeneity with respect to both programmes and participants and to observe interesting labour market outcomes over eight years after programme start.
Generally, training increases long-term employment prospects and earnings, but does not change registered unemployment. The positive long-run effects need some years to materialise because for all programmes, there are initial negative (lock-in) effects. The magnitude of the lock-in effects is related to the programme duration.
This general finding is, however, not at all true for men who participate in long training or retraining. At least part of the explanation for these negative results is that caseworkers in East Germany severely misjudged the future demand for skills for men. They tended to retrain many of the male unemployed towards occupations in the construction sector (about 70% of the participants in retraining) that experienced a boom during those years. Unfortunately, soon after the courses were completed, the boom went into a bust and the blessings of having obtained funding for long vocational training became a curse for its participants.
A caveat of our analyses is that we are not able to perform a cost-benefit analysis because of the unavailability of cost data both on the individual level and aggregated for each type of training. As another caveat, before the year 2000, it is impossible in our data to distinguish between subsidised employment, e.g. in an employment programme, and unsubsidised employment in the first labour market. This needs to be taken into account when interpreting the effects during the first six to seven years after programme start. However, because for 2002 these data are available, our long-term findings are not subject to this problem. 4.1
Notes:
The sample used for the table is the one after all selection steps described in Section 3, but before imposing the common support requirement.
Entries that do not add up to 100% within a group of dummy variables are due to observations with missing information, and rounding.
a
The results for variables marked with an asterisk are means rather than proportions. The category 'No information' includes both cases with missing earnings information and with the entry '0'. Zero entries are made for so-called inactive employment, which includes women on maternity leave, men in the military or civil service, as well as employees having been ill for more than six weeks. The first column gives the number of observations used to compute the proportions. The sample size decreases due to different entry dates into the sample (first UE spell in 93/94) and exit dates from the sample. Career improvement is omitted because it contains only eight individuals.
Training the Unemployed in a Changing Economy Step 1 Restrict sample to common support: delete all observations with probabilities larger than the smallest maximum and smaller than the largest minimum of all subsamples defined by S Step 3
Estimate the respective (counterfactual) expectations of the outcome variables For a given value of m and l, the following steps are performed Standard propensity score matching step (multiple treatments) (a-1) Choose one observation in the subsample defined by participation in m and delete it from that pool (b-1) Find an observation in the subsample of participants in l that is as close as possible to the one chosen in step (a-1) in terms ofP Exploit double robustness properties to adjust small mismatches by regression (e) Using the weights w(x i ) obtained in (d-2), run a weighted linear regression of the outcome variable on the variables used to define the distance (and an intercept) (f-1) Predict the potential outcome y l (x i ) of every observation in l and m using the coefficients of this regression:ŷ l ðx i Þ (f-2) Estimate the bias of the matching estimator for EðY l jS ¼ mÞ as:
(g) Using the weights obtained by weighted matching in (d-2), compute a weighted mean of the outcome variables in l. Subtract the bias from this estimate Final estimate (h) Compute the treatment effect by subtracting the weighted mean of the outcomes in the comparison group (l ) from the weighted mean in the treatment group (m) Step 4
Repeat
Step 3 for all combinations of m and l Notes: Lechner (2001) suggests an estimator of the asymptotic standard errors forŷ m;l N conditional on the weights that we use here.x includes the date of the beginning of the programme, sex, three dummies indicating whether the individual is employed (and observed) 12, 24 and 36 months before the programme.x is included to ensure a high match quality with respect to these critical variables. R is fixed to 90% in this application (different values are checked in the sensitivity analysis). Note that once we estimate all E(Y l |S 5 m) for all m, they can be directly used to obtain E(Y l ). 
